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On February 23, 2010, in New York City, the National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
at Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health (NCDP) convened a unique 
roundtable of experts to discuss the impacts on a major U.S. city and the surrounding 
region, of the detonation by terrorists of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device. Aware 
of the immediate impact of such a major catastrophic event, participants were nonetheless 
asked to focus on potential conditions and challenges in the affected region three days 
following the attack. The goal of the roundtable was to understand the nature and scope 
of these challenges and to frame questions considered essential for appropriate planning. 
 
Day Three was premised on the notions that (a) while nuclear terrorism is a low 
probability event, it is by no means far-fetched; (b) consequences would be devastating 
and (c) emergency response planning to date falls far short in terms of assuring regional 
readiness at an appropriate scale. 
 
A summary of the proceedings of this “not for attribution” conference comprises the 
body of this report. Key points made and questions raised during the course of the 
discussions include: 
 
1. There was consensus among the participants that no American city or region, even 
with abundant state and federal government and military support, has sufficient 
health care infrastructure and resources to handle the anticipated injuries and 
illness from the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear device. 
 
2. Participants agreed that a detonation likely would cause a difficult to control 
spontaneous mass evacuation, that evacuees would try to get at least 10-20 miles or 
more away from the detonation site, and that such an exodus would have significant 
adverse impacts on the communities through which it passed. 
 
3. It was noted that federal, state and local responsibilities following a detonation are not 
adequately defined or integrated into a regional response plan, and that in general, the 
roles, functions and planning needs of the surrounding communities do not receive 
appropriate attention. 
 
4. Several experts cited emerging evidence that the radioactivity of fallout decays very 
quickly and that common urban structures can provide substantial protection from 
radiation.  Relatively short periods of “sheltering in place” followed by evacuation will 
be the most appropriate strategy to assure optimal survival. 
 
5. Participants identified several priorities that should receive substantial attention 
and significant additional resources: regional communications capacity, IND-specific 
regional training and comprehensive exercises, hospital and health system capacity and 





In view of the panel discussions, NCDP, the roundtable’s host, recommends that the 
following questions be addressed in future exercises and planning initiatives for possible 
IND detonations: 
 
• It is assumed that the aftermath of an IND event, local, regional and national 
conditions may be extremely dynamic in unpredictable ways. Is the response 
system equipped to switch gears dramatically and abruptly? 
 
• After 9/11, the federal government acted promptly to secure the nation against a 
follow-on attack, temporarily freezing most transportation and commerce. How 
will incident commanders prevent such actions from interfering with the 
“just in time” supply chains on which state health and emergency 
management departments rely to maintain their supplies and equipment, 
and on which private sector logistics contractors rely to execute federal  
agencies’ response plans? 
 
• Communications that persuade people to shelter in place during the first few 
hours, and in places with high protective factors, are critical. Can the 
government get these messages out fast enough to take advantage of this 
window, especially if there has been an electromagnetic pulse? Do the 
messengers have sufficient credibility and public trust across a wide range of  
diverse communities?                                                                                                        
 
• If the national government plans to have federal military and civilian 
personnel supplement local law enforcement resources and response efforts, 
does it have a communications plan in place to explain this as it is 
happening? 
 
• A mass self-evacuation could congeal highways, secondary roads and local streets 
spreading outward from the regional center, including many abandoned cars that 
have run out of gas.  Such gridlock would compromise plans to mobilize first 
responders and transportation resources, move victims to treatment facilities, 
deploy local law enforcement, establish mobile hospitals and distribute state and 
federal relief and response supplies to where they are needed. Who would take 
charge to address transportation paralysis? Would federal and state 
governments feel inhibited from violating property rights—driving tow 
trucks over lawns, commandeering parking lots, breaking into abandoned 
cars—in order to clear lanes for the necessary supply and response vehicles? 
Would the National Guard or military be willing or able to air lift in heavy 
equipment to participate in such an effort? 
 
• How might a mass evacuation affect food supplies, water, sanitary and health 





• Without clear protocols, legal protections and command structures, who will 
make the decisions to (a) reopen hospitals initially closed due to fallout 
contamination; (b) create surge bed capacity through accelerated discharge of 
current patients; (c) triage patients and arrange for their movement to appropriate 
treatment facilities; (d) invoke and administer alternative standards of care; (e) 
provide palliative care and religious services for victims triaged to the “expectant” 
category; and (f) transport and provide custody for the bodies of decedents? 
 
• The congregation of the “worried well” and citizens seeking information, solace 
or safety; inflows of people requiring decontamination; inadequate hospital 
security plans; and inconsistent or ill-chosen statements by public officials, all 
could impair functioning hospitals’ ability to provide patient care. What will 
incident managers do to minimize such failures? 
 
• What could incident commanders do if (as expected) many medical personnel, 
first responders, law enforcement personnel and volunteers do not report to the 
scene or assist victims due to widespread fear or misunderstanding of radiation 
and its effects? Or if they discover that estimates of available personnel have been 
inadvertently inflated by double counting (e.g., counting a nurse as a hospital 
employee, MRC member AND as a National Guard member) 
 
• Are there duplicative requisition and approval processes that delay or compromise 
the overall federal response? Do high level federal demands for situational 
awareness and data interfere with efforts on the ground? 
 
• Federal agencies view their role following an IND as “reacting” and “supporting” 
rather than directing, but what would federal leaders do if local leadership isn’t 
forthcoming, for example, if state and/or local leadership is physically 
incapacitated, politically paralyzed or overwhelmed by the event? 
 
• If sheltering in place is deemed necessary for an extended period—particularly in 
high rise buildings—how might this complicate the role of agencies like the Red 
Cross in delivering emergency food and water supplies? This is particularly 
pertinent if there has been an EMP that disabled elevators, refrigeration and other 
essential power-dependent infrastructure? 
 
This report was prepared by NCDP and summarizes the key issues considered during the 
day-long meeting.  Although there was substantial consensus among participants around 
the following issues, the roundtable did not entertain or make formal recommendations.
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Key Issues and Consensus Findings Regarding Regional 
Preparedness for “Day Three” 
 
1. Common Rationales for Avoiding Regional Planning and Preparedness must be 
Re-examined. 
 
Introductory speakers opened the proceedings by acknowledging that even in the face 
of compelling evidence and a strong political consensus that nuclear terrorism is a 
significant national security issue, some observers do not consider preparing a 
regional response to nuclear terrorism a good idea or good use of resources.  They 
discussed many of the reasons commonly offered for avoiding the subject, including 
psychological denial, fatalism, and an outdated and inaccurate Cold War notion that a 
ground-level detonation of a 10-Kt IND would vaporize everyone and everything.  
Many local emergency preparedness and response officials unconsciously subscribe 
to this notion and react to the idea of regional planning for an IND event with a 
variant of “it doesn’t matter; we’re all dead, anyway.”   
 
Some officials are daunted by the cost of preparing for such an incident when the 
U.S. faces so many other urgent and expensive challenges.  Other potent barriers to a 
regional planning effort include the enormous number of federal agencies with 
jurisdiction over and responsibilities for nuclear terrorism preparedness, the 
siloization of many agencies and funding streams, and the complexity of 
Congressional oversight of nuclear and security issues.  
 
The detonation of an IND in a large city would be a disaster on an epic, 
unprecedented scale, causing far more damage, casualties and injuries than anything 
America had experienced previously.  Hospitals, emergency response, transportation, 
communications and other critical infrastructure systems would be affected—possibly 
overwhelmed—and physical and psychological effects would be widespread.  The 
loss of electricity, water, and basic communications would be a huge burden for 
rescue, recovery, and for daily living among the survivors.  Yet there would be many 
survivors, and just a little greater awareness of what the public and the responders 
need to do could dramatically improve the outcome.  
 
As one panelist described it, almost any improvement to the status quo of regional 
planning and preparedness could save tens or hundreds of thousands of lives. In his 
view, the key challenges of responding to an IND are minimizing avoidable 
exposures to radiation, reaching the victims, identifying those who can benefit from 
treatment, and then connecting them with America’s huge medical resources.  The 
goal is to avoid a “nuclear Katrina,” in which people who could have survived 
through self-protective actions or with available medical treatment, died 
unnecessarily.  
 
Several participants indicated that learning to deal flexibly with out-of-sequence, 
unplanned consequences is one of the most essential parts of emergency response 
planning and training. One commented that “we need to expect chaos,” that incident 
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command would be severely downgraded and decisions would need to be made 
rapidly. Another offered the perspective that “you actually can’t plan, from my 
opinion, for what you’re talking about.  You can plan for an array of possibilities.  
But you actually don’t know.”  
 
2. Regional Actors Must Piggy-back IND Planning and Preparedness on All 
Hazards Preparedness 
 
Speakers recommended building regional capacity and preparedness for an IND event 
incrementally, through ongoing training, collaboration and exercises.  Wherever 
possible, all levels of government should deliberately build into their planning for 
non-nuclear events specific issues that they anticipate would arise following an IND 
detonation, and use those exercises as opportunities to crystallize issues and lessons 
that are germane to a regional IND response.  As one participant stated, “practice 
makes you better at any event.  And so you role a piece of this into any practice you 
do.” For example: 
 
• A major city may develop a plan and conduct exercises related to a potential 48-
hour system-wide electrical blackout.  Such an exercise could address some of the 
issues associated with the electromagnetic pulse from an air burst of an IND.   
 
• Planning the emergency response to a major gas explosion in a large public 
facility or office building could illuminate many of the hospital and medical surge 
issues that would arise in the context of nuclear terrorism.   
 
• Building complex triage issues into such plans and exercises—how to invoke and 
administer altered standards of care, how and where to transport victims requiring 
immediate treatment if there was transportation gridlock, how to provide 
palliative care and religious services to “expectant” victims, and how to address 
relatives’ reactions to triage decisions—also would yield invaluable lessons.   
 
3. Many Lives Can Be Saved Beyond a One Half Mile Radius from a 10 Kiloton 
Urban Ground Burst 
 
If a ground level detonation occurred on a work day in the downtown of the largest 
American cities, over 100,000 people would die immediately within a radius of 
approximately one half mile.  Further out, in a zone extending roughly .5 mile to 1 
mile, there would be a large number of life-threatening injuries from the initial blast 
and the dynamic wind effects of the nuclear shockwave, including broken glass, 
façade damage in buildings, extensive flying rubble and debris in the urban canyon.   
Although the physical destruction in this zone would hinder evacuation and limit 
responders’ access and mobility, many of the expected injuries could be successfully 
treated if medical resources were accessible.  Furthermore, prompt protective action 
by the public could avoid most radiation-related illness in this zone.  Still further out 
(1 to 3 miles out), injuries would result largely from window breakage and the 
buckling of large, flat surfaces and the fallout plume also would be a hazard. The 
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injuries in this zone are not yet-well modeled or understood, but the number of 
immediate injuries is assumed to be relatively light.  
 
An air burst would change everything. Under certain conditions, a detonation 
above ground level would generate an “electromagnetic pulse” (EMP).   One 
participant suggested that the EMP from a 10 Kt air burst could knock out all 
electronics and cause severe damage to power and telecommunication system in an 
area 2-3 times the radius of the major blast damage, and for an indeterminate period 
of time.  A regional scale EMP could only arise from events far outside the terrorism 
scenario—the detonation of a one megaton device high in the stratosphere. 
 
An EMP would cripple both emergency communications and emergency response 
for an unknown period of time. Describing the likely impact on hospitals and other 
health facilities, one presenter observed:  “If you're a medical professional, you're 
back to practicing medicine with a stethoscope and a mercury thermometer, not even 
a digital thermometer. You won't have power and you won't have instrumentation, 
until it's rebuilt. Medical personnel will have to use rudimentary 18th century-style 
medicine.”   
 
Panelists also confirmed that compared to a ground detonation, an air burst would 
deliver a greater portion of its energy as thermal energy, resulting in a much higher 
number of life-threatening burn injuries, a scenario for which the United States as a 
whole has minimal surge capacity and no clear path to increasing that capacity.  
Panelists considered the possibility that many burn victims would not receive any 
treatment. 
 
4. Radiation Illness from Fallout May be More Preventable than Previously 
Thought 
 
People can see fallout coming at them and seek shelter.  The particles are readily 
visible, the size of a grain of salt or sand, and are too large to inhale.  Although 
people cannot unknowingly be in the presence of fallout or inhale it, exposure to the 
invisible radiation that fallout particles emit is extremely dangerous, and taking 
shelter promptly is urgent. Panelists provided two essential findings about the fallout 
hazard. 
 
First, fallout’s radioactivity diminishes very quickly, i.e., within one half hour after 
particles have landed on a roof, sidewalk, car or other surface.   
  
Second, buildings and other common urban structures provide shielding effects 
based upon their construction materials.  Increased distance from exterior walls, 
roofs and other places where the fallout has landed also provides protection.  Civil 
defense ratings for structures give approximate protection factors (some panelists 
considered these ratings conservative). A single story wood frame house may have a 
protection factor of only 2 or 3, while the basement of a multi-story office building 
may have a much greater protection factor of 200-300.  
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If all those who survived the initial blast could shelter in an underground parking lot, 
there would be no significant radiation exposure or illness among that population. 
But sheltering even in structures with much lower protection factors would radically 
reduce morbidity and mortality.  Prolonged sheltering might not be necessary. 
Individuals could start to evacuate anywhere between 5 and 24 hours after the blast, 
depending upon the degree of protection provided by their sheltering facility, the 
location of the fallout plume and other health and safety hazards in the area.  
 
Yet fear of radiation is a fundamental impediment to effective response. 
Attendees discussed how lack of information and misinformation about radiation 
inhibit the public and emergency response personnel, and that there is a widespread 
attitude towards radiation that it is an “invisible death” that cannot be protected 
against.  Survey data consistently show that radiation is the most feared and least 
understood hazard.  Emergency responders report that they’re less familiar or 
comfortable with radiation than any other hazard, and that they question their 
professional preparation for radiation risks.  
 
Medical personnel must be better educated about radiation so that they will report 
for duty when needed, treat people requiring decontamination, be able to accurately 
assess and interpret radiation risks, and lead recovery and rescue efforts.  If 
irradiated health facilities are to be reclaimed, medical personnel must be secure and 
confident of the physical plant safety in order to do their work and treat patients.   
 
One participant characterized the readiness of local hospitals and emergency 
management departments to deal with radiation-related response issues as “less than 
full operational preparedness but considerably more than simply awareness.”  In the 
context of this discussion, panelists were informed of efforts in some localities to 
create radiological reserves corps, consisting of health physicists, radiation safety 
technicians and scientists with specialized radiation expertise.  One participant noted 
that the Conference on Radiation Control Program Directors already has given a 
small number of grants for that purpose. 
 
An attendee asked about how hospitals that are set up to decontaminate one or two 
people per day could be expected to scale up by many orders of magnitude in order 
to play their expected role in mass decontamination efforts. “How do we go from 1 
to 1,000?”  This prompted some discussion of whether decontamination is actually 
as complex and time-consuming a process as some believe, especially as 
radioactivity would decay quickly.  One participant opined that removing one’s 
clothes, shaking out one’s hair and showering will amount to a “full 
decontamination.” He added “I don’t believe decon is going to be a significant issue 
for these patients.”  Psychologically though, medical staff would need to feel 
comfortable treating patients who have been exposed. Both education and radiation 






5. Hospital surge capacity is insufficient to respond to an IND 
 
Many participants agreed that current hospital surge capacity is nowhere near what 
would be necessary in this scenario.  To make matters worse, in some cities, major 
hospitals and burn and trauma centers—the treatment resources most needed 
following an IND—are concentrated downtown, in the zone of presumed near-total 
destruction.   
 
Many hospitals cannot afford to build much spare capacity into their systems.  Like 
many other enterprises in a globalized economy, they hold small inventories of 
equipment and supplies on the expectation of getting daily “just in time” deliveries 
and having access to small surge capacity.   Following an IND, limited on hand 
supplies, coupled with staff concerns about radiation safety and disrupted 
transportation networks and impassable highways, would vastly limit hospitals’ 
ability to acquire the supplies and assemble the necessary workforce. 
 
Participants discussed potential strategies for increasing regional surge capacity, 
such as building networks of cooperating hospitals and health facilities and 
involving and integrating the private medical system into the training and 
educational infrastructure for public hospital networks and emergency responders.  
One panelist, however, cited a preparedness exercise (unrelated to INDs) in which 
130 hospitals were required to cooperate for just one day. “The system crashed,” the 
presenter said bluntly. In practice, hospitals may partner with one or two other 
organizations, but they do not routinely engage with the large numbers that would be 
involved in this case.  
 
Noting that following disasters, hospitals typically attract not only patients (and well 
people) seeking medical care, but also people seeking loved ones, reassurance, 
shelter or companionship, participants argued that after an IND event, people would 
overwhelm functioning hospitals, burden them with extraordinary security and 
public safety demands and make it impossible for them to provide tertiary care.   
 
Hospitals often devote inadequate resources to security on the assumption that law 
enforcement will fill that role during a true emergency.  In general, however, police 
departments have not prepared for that, and hospitals would need to undertake much 
more planning in order to be able to secure themselves by Day Three. 
 
Participants discussed the general lack of protocols to test that the level of radiation 
in closed hospitals has dissipated, to certify that those facilities are once again safe 
for occupancy and to overcome significant fears of radiation among health care 
providers and patients alike.  Some attendees noted the likely difficulties of moving 
large numbers of patients to remote hospitals and questioned the feasibility of mobile 
hospitals as a real, scalable resource.  
 
Participants believed that large numbers of people would volunteer to assist in this 
kind of crisis, but that it would be an immense challenge to deploy—i.e., feed, 
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shelter, transport, train and equip—such an army of volunteers safely and 
effectively.  Some participants noted that the potential reserve pool of medically 
trained volunteers is consistently overestimated due to double counting (for instance, 
one nurse might be counted as hospital staff, on the state registry, and as a Medical 
Reserve Corps resource).  
  
6. Triage and Altered Standards of Care Must be Established Now 
 
After an IND attack, large numbers of injured patients could present and overwhelm 
medical facilities. Many participants were concerned about effective methods to do 
triage within this mass trauma setting.  Issues included how triage standards may 
have to change based on volume and types of injuries faced or based on available 
medical resources. Altered standards of care bring up legal, regulatory and ethical 
issues that have not been adequately addressed.   
 
Estimates of triage outcomes in at least one major IND simulation placed nearly 
twenty percent more victims in the “expectant” category than in the “immediate” 
category.  Depending upon the setting, either category could far exceed the most 
optimistic hospital bed surge capacity.  This estimate highlighted the issue that upon 
an IND, treating expectant victims in hospitals could deny treatment to people whose 
lives can be saved with immediate care. Alternate settings such as low-tech, medium 
scale facilities would be needed to deliver palliative care and religious services for 
the “expectant” victims.   
 
One participant, anticipating the on-the-fly enlistment of volunteers in relief efforts, 
strongly urged the adoption of altered standards of care and related legal protections.  
She said that when the disaster occurs, “the reality is that you're not going to have 
doctors and nurses, but the people who are there at the time.  And so we need to have 
plans as to how we can use lay people to provide medical care.”  Another participant 
informed the conference that the Department of Health and Human Services recently 
has contracted with the Institute of Medicine to produce a study on this topic. 
  
A panelist raised the issue of how extraordinary losses of capacity in the hospital 
system, coupled with extraordinary demands on functioning hospitals, would 
negatively affect outpatient healthcare such as nursing homes, dialysis units and 
same day surgery clinics, and also how such outpatient facilities potentially could 
contribute to IND surge requirements. This highlights an issue that largely went 
unaddressed: as all regional (and perhaps even national) medical resources 
instantaneously would become scarce following an IND detonation, the ethical 
issues in allocating those resources immediately would become urgent and require 
prompt resolution. 
 
7. Planners Must Anticipate Spontaneous, Highly Disruptive Self-Evacuations 
 
Based upon the experience of the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, in which 
virtually nobody stayed at the officially designated shelter, conference participants 
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agreed that upon an IND event, the vast majority of those who are able would 
attempt to evacuate the urban core, on their own and in their own vehicles, and 
would travel much farther than they actually need to.  Therefore, official messages 
that counteract what appears to be a strong and pervasive “flight” instinct are critical. 
 
Depending upon the city in which the attack occurred, communities up to 150 miles 
away would feel the impact of this mass displacement.  Attendees observed a 
presentation of a map-based modeling tool that predicts community population surge 
following an urban disaster and gives surrounding communities more information on 
which to plan and prepare for an influx of evacuees.  The tool considers a variety of 
factors such as road networks, number of hotel rooms and other resources that may 
make a particular peripheral community a potentially desirable destination.  
 
Tens or hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the city center would drain food, 
water and gasoline from communities as they passed through or chose to shelter 
there. Participants focused on the need and opportunities for advance planning and 
collaboration between the urban center and the surrounding communities that might 
be at the receiving end of the evacuation.  One noted that in the context of hurricane 
and pandemic planning, his municipality and several surrounding counties already 
had established teams to help identify and anticipate potential impacts of a mass 
movement out of the city.  
 
A mass evacuation in personal cars most likely would compromise official plans for 
mobilizing responders, transporting patients and delivering state and federal supplies 
and equipment.   Traffic congealment could completely shut down highway and road 
networks and block the exit and entry routes into the city center.  Strategies for 
moving large numbers of patients to distant medical facilities must take this likely 
gridlock into account. Traffic congestion also could impede the movement of 
personnel and supplies into the crisis zone for re-supply efforts.   A panelist called 
Day 3 “the re-load” period for both personnel and supplies, since the first responders 
would need respite and many on-hand supplies would have run-out.  
 
During a discussion of alternatives to surface evacuation of patients, a participant 
asked for clarification of the rate at which the military and National Guard could 
evacuate patients by air.  One panelist noted that the number of patients per day 
would vary based upon the nature and severity of the patients’ illnesses and injuries, 
how far the patients needed to be transported and whether or not there was interstate 
or international movement.  One other consideration, which initially took some 
participants by surprise, would be whether or not it was considered acceptable to 
have any patients expire in transit.  For some, this was an unexpected and unfamiliar 







8. Intra-Regional and Federal-Regional Integration Is Still Badly Lacking, Not 
Well understood by Emergency Planners 
 
There was significant difference of opinion among conference participants as to 
whether adequate regional planning had taken place on the federal, regional or local 
level. At one extreme, some felt that virtually no planning had taken place. At the 
other, people argued that extensive planning already has led to the creation of 
adequate systems and structures.   There was concern that local and regional 
agencies rely too heavily on the federal government and may have a false sense of 
security that the federal government immediately would come to the rescue.  There 
was consensus that local governments need to accept their role in an IND response 
and plan for 1) sheltering in place, 2) evacuation, 3) assessing their own capabilities 
and resources, and 4) management and support.   One participant speculated that 
“local health departments will probably be stumbling because they have not accepted 
their role in response to a nuclear detonation.” 
 
An important topic related to regional decision-making is how the state government 
and regional actors would interact with federal agencies in order to determine where 
to deploy and how to deliver federally-provided relief and response assets.    
Participants agreed that high level state officials would lead this process.  However, 
even the states that have devoted substantial efforts to this question may have 
answered it only in part.  The specific state and federal staff who will make those 
decisions know each other, know where they all are located and know their 
respective roles in the process.  Furthermore, some states have put in place 
mechanisms to quickly mobilize trucks to pick up federal assets delivered to state 
airports.  But detailed decision rules and processes for actual logistics decisions are 
not yet in place.  Opinions also varied considerably as to whether unified command 
would be necessary or possible following an IND attack.   
 
9. Local, State and Regional Agencies Must be Able to Lead Response 
 
Panelists noted that the “movie version” of the federal government swooping in to 
take control and commandeer the regional response effort is grossly inaccurate.  
Local first responders will be first people at the scene and the last people to leave. 
As part of a “tiered response,” in which state and federal resources are brought to 
bear only when local governments request assistance, the federal government always 
would act in a support role, not a leadership role. The Department of Defense, in 
particular, would be the last agency in and the first agency out.  Some participants 
questioned how this reactive federal posture would deal with a leadership vacuum at 
the state and/or local level. 
 
It was noted that during an actual disaster response the process is not necessarily 
sequential.  Requests, authorizations and allocations often occur in “parallel 
processes,” and are repeated again and again as needs arise.  Federal agencies that 
would play a major role in response efforts—DHS, HHS, DOD—require very 
specific, needs-driven requests from its state and local interlocutors, rather than 
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open-ended, imprecise requests to send supplies and equipment.  Additionally, on 
Day 3, the White House, the media and the general public all would be “numbers 
hungry” to gauge the magnitude of the disaster and ground the disaster in existing 
federal policies and laws.   Panelists indicated that the federal government is aware 
that satisfying procedural and information requirements is a burden on local, state 
and regional government at the moment of maximum stress and most constrained 
resources, and will work with those governments to put in place arrangements before 
disasters occur. 
 
10. Once the Federal Government Decides What, When and to Whom, It Can 
Deliver Supplies and Personnel Quickly. But it Could Not Make Those Decisions 
Quickly Following an IND. 
 
One panelist reported that transportation planning and coordination had improved 
greatly in recent years. There are now established systems that can get supplies and 
medical teams to a disaster site in 12 or 24 hours, respectively.   But it can take much 
longer than that to make the decision to send equipment or people somewhere.   The 
United States has little experience with no warning, catastrophic events and the 
federal response systems are better attuned to situations (such as hurricanes) where 
agencies may have five or six days notice to mobilize and prepare. The recent 
experience in Haiti demonstrated how hard it is for the federal government to get 
adequate situational awareness of a sudden complex disaster, to make decisions about 
deploying limited resources and to ramp up relief efforts quickly.  
 
11.  Communications and Messaging Are Critical but Underdeveloped 
 
A cross-cutting topic was the paramount importance of public behavior and responses 
to official communications in determining the effectiveness of any regional response 
to an IND.   Generally, participants believed that communications and information 
would have a profound effect on public reactions and responses.  In one participant’s 
words, “Public information issues, communication, messaging really need to be at the 
very heart of planning, preparedness and response to a nuclear detonation event.”  
 
Incomprehension of terms such as “shelter in place” and “informed evacuation” 
would limit public compliance with official directives.  Participants suggested that 
well-crafted, positive “do this” messages are more effective in eliciting the desired 
response than “don’t do that” messages, that the general public (and especially 
minority communities) is quite fatalistic about nuclear terrorism and that planners and 
officials must weaken such fatalism in order to make people more likely to undertake 
the protective actions.  
 
Participants repeatedly emphasized the importance of preparing for effective 
communications by practicing, and by cultivating long-standing relationships and 
partnerships with community and religious organizations.  They also reiterated the 
importance of not sending inaccurate, confusing or panicked messages. As one 
conference participant phrased it, “your main resources are confidence and time but 
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both of these are wasting resources, they erode on you.”   
 
There was some consensus that federal and state government risk messaging are 
inconsistent and uncoordinated, for instance, conflicting advice on whether it is best 
to shelter immediately or evacuate immediately.  Participants discussed the 
desirability of state and local officials knowing in advance the content and sequence 
of high level emergency messages that would emanate from the federal government, 
and whether such messages would come from the President, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security or other officials. 
 
Citizen preparedness is a key issue, but effective strategies have been elusive.  Public 
education about risks and hazards would seem to be the ideal solution, but experience 
shows that education campaigns are ineffective if people aren’t receptive to the 
information. To further this concept one participant acknowledged, “ People are 
going to make decision contrary to what we want them to do if we’re not working 
with them in advance….” Furthermore, “the people who have the messages to deliver 
need to understand what the communication infrastructure looks like.” This poses a 
special challenge for a topic that very few people are willing to discuss, let alone 
























Resources and Starting Points 
 
Some resources and starting points were suggested by participants: 
 
Publications: 
• Planning Guide for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 2009 (www.hps.org/hsc) 
• Key Response Planning Factors in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism, 2009 
(www.hps.org/hsc) 
• Rural Preparedness Planning Guide (NORC, walshcenter.norc.org) 
• FEMA’s National Fallout Shelter List, last updated in 1992. Despite its 
publication date, many buildings on the list would still be available for use.  
 
Federal or Regional Coordinating Agencies 
• Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS) There are 125 MMRS 
programs that cover approximately 70% of the population. 
• MDMS This HHS division has 10 regional offices.  
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